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INTERNET GAMBLING: IS IT WORTH THE RISK?
JAMES R. HOBBS*
Amy R. PERRY
I. INTRODUcrION
The use of Internet technology for gambling is a novel idea to
some, but for others it is a criminal prosecution waiting to happen.
The convenience of Internet gambling is appealing. No long
flights to Las Vegas or Atlantic City, just a click of the mouse and
bets are in, and the payoffs can be stunning. But you could be com-
mitting a crime. It is possible never to set foot in a state and still
break its gambling laws, without even knowing what you did was
wrong. Several states are cracking down on Internet gambling and
the people who run it. Recently, the attorneys general in Minne-
sota and Missouri indicted companies who operate Internet gam-
bling sites, saying that residents of their states use these sites and
therefore, the companies violated state gambling statutes.' But
where does the bet actually take place: where the bettor is or where
the online service is located? Is it possible for an individual to be
guilty of violating a statute without even knowing that statute
existed?
An Internet casino allows an individual to play casino-type
games, like blackjack or roulette, for money. There are three types
of Internet casinos. Some casinos require people to download a
* Adjunct Instructor, University of Missouri at Kansas City Law School; Part-
ner, Wyrsch Hobbs Mirakian & Lee, P.C. Westminster College, University of Kan-
sas at Lawrence, B.A.; University of Missouri at Kansas City Law School, J.D.
1. See State, ex rel. Nixon v. Interactive Gaming & Communications Corp., No.
CV97-7808 (Mo. Ct. App. May 22, 1997), available at http://www.bna.com/e-law/
cases/intergame.html; see also State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715,
715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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program to a computer hard drive in order to play. 2 Other casinos
use JAVA applets to run through the World Wide Web browser. An-
other type of Internet casino uses all HTML and does not require
any download time.3 These different sites may vary in appearance
and style, but they all have one thing in common - they are played
to win money. A first time gambler on a typical Internet gambling
site opens an account by providing his or her credit card number,
although some sites require customers to mail in a minimum de-
posit ahead of time. 4 Site operators use computer programs to sim-
ulate several different games of chance. 5 Winnings are paid by
check or sometimes credited to the player's credit card, while losses
are debited from the account. 6 With virtual gambling made so sim-
ple, it is easy to see why analysts have predicted that Internet gam-
bling sites could handle as much as one billion dollars by the year
2000.7 There are currently more than four hundred Internet gam-
ing sites in operation, and that number is steadily growing.8
This Article examines the current state of gambling statutes
across the nation, as applied to Internet gambling, as well as the
criminal mens rea requirement that those statutes entail. Finally,
this Article explores the issue of jurisdiction and how a civil stan-
dard is being applied to Internet prosecutions.
II. GAMBLING STATUTES
The statute governing Internet gambling is 18 U.S.C. § 1084. 9
According to the statute, the elements of Internet gambling are: (1)
engaging in the business of betting or wagering; (2) knowingly us-
2. See Netbet.org, Online Gambling Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.netbet.org (last modified 1998). This is an Internet site which provides infor-
mation to new Internet gamblers.
3. See id. (discussing growing popularity of online gambling).
4. See Beth Berselli, Gamblers Play the Odds Online, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1997,
at A01 (discussing growing popularity of online betting).
5. See id. After the bets are placed, the computer conducts the game, and
operators report the results of the game back to the players. See id.
6. See id. (discussing manner in which online transactions are handled).
7. See id. Other analysts in 1997 predicted that Internet gambling was a $200
million per year industry. See id.
8. See Internet Gaming Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.internetcommission.com/faq.asq#gl (last visited Sept. 9, 2000). According to
the Internet Gaming Commission ("IGC"), the total number of Internet gaming
sites is 428. See id. Of those, 133 are licensed, 120 are unlicensed, 132 are licensed
but have not been reviewed by the Internet Gaming Commission, and 43 are li-
censed but refuse to cooperate with auditors from the IGC. See id.
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1999). This statute prohibits the transmission of bet-
ting or wagering information where a state or foreign country, either at the site of
transmission or reception, has made such activity illegal. See id.
[Vol. 7: p. I
2
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss1/1
2000] INTERNET GAMBLING: IS IT WORTH THE RISK? 3
ing a wire communication facility; and (3) transmitting bets or wa-
gers in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 The statute makes it legal
to wager on "a sporting event or contest from a state where betting
on that sporting event or contest is legal into a state in which such
betting is legal."'" Internet gambling companies, however, usually
operate offshore and have licenses from foreign countries to con-
duct betting. 12 The problems arise because most of their customers
are located within the United States where wagering is, for the most
part, illegal.
When trying to determine exactly who is in violation of this
statute, it is important to look closely at the term "transmission,"
because courts are divided on how to apply it. Some courts have
applied the term to the actual transmittal of wagering information
as well as to the receipt of those wagers. 13 Other courts interpret
the term "transmission" to apply only to the party initiating the
communication and not to the person receiving it.14 In the future,
most jurisdictions most likely will interpret the meaning of "trans-
mission" broadly to include the receiving party if that party actually
solicited the communication.' 5
10. See id.; see also United States v. Truchinski, 393 F.2d 627, 630 (8th Cir.
1968) (explaining that defendant must be engaged in business of wagering or bet-
ting and using telephone to transmit bets).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b). This is problematic, however, because every state
except Nevada has made this type of gambling activity illegal.
12. See Internet Gambling Commission, supra note 8. Antigua, Curacao, St.
Kitts, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Gibraltar and Cook Islands are just a few of
the countries that are home to Internet gambling operations. See id. These small
countries allow Internet gambling operators to locate and operate there because
doing so is a boost to their economies. See id. Companies may pay up to $100,000
to obtain a license in these countries along with ongoing taxes to the local govern-
ment. See id. Although these sites are located outside the United States, the com-
panies are actually run from within the U.S. See id. Only the servers are located
offshore. In fact, several Internet gambling companies are listed on the NASDAQ
stock exchange. See id.
13. See United States v. Mrnnnnugh Rr F9d 11(A 1104 (Rth Cir. 1Q8)
(holding that § 1084 included placing of bets by telephone from Texas to Massa-
chusetts regardless of whether placing bets in Massachusetts was state criminal
offense).
14. See United States v. Stonehouse, 452 F.2d 455, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1971)
(holding that text and legislative history of statute support conclusion that "trans-
mission" does not apply to reception); see also Tel. News Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (rejecting idea that transmission means send-
ing or receiving).
15. See Philip Palmer McGuigan, Stakes Are High in Battle to Bar Internet Gam-
bling, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at B8 (discussing dangers of Internet gambling and
recent crackdown by federal officials).
3
Hobbs: Internet Gambling: Is It Worth the Risk
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
4 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JoURNAL
Only four states, Kansas, Louisiana, South Dakota and Indiana,
specifically mention the Internet in their gambling statutes.1 6 Kan-
sas lawmakers have made it a crime to install communication facili-
ties for gamblers when it is known that these facilities will be used
principally for the purpose of transmitting information to be used
in making or settling bets. 17 Under the Kansas statute, it is a viola-
tion to allow knowingly the use of these devices to transmit informa-
tion that pertains to the making or settling of bets or to allow the
continued use of these devices.18 According to the interpretation
of this statute, placing or forwarding a bet over the telephone or
Internet is illegal, just as if the bet were conducted in person. 19
The Louisiana statute was enacted to prevent and penalize In-
ternet gambling. 20 The statute defines the crime, in part, as "the
intentional conducting, or directly assisting in the conducting as a
business of any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a per-
son risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit
when accessing the Internet."21 The Louisiana statute contains a
less specific general intent requirement.
Gambling ranges from a class C misdemeanor to a class A fel-
ony in the rest of the country. Only a handful of states do not apply
the traditional definition of "knowingly" in their statutes. 22 The re-
maining states use the general intent requirement, whereby an In-
ternet gambling site operator is guilty of gambling if the operator is
aware that three players can gamble on the site. This use of general
intent cannot be enough protection because most states can use the
16. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-5-1 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4308 (2000);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-25A (Michie
2000).
17. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214308(b). Kansas law defines gambling as, "(a)
making a bet; or (b) entering or remaining in a gambling place with intent to
make a bet, to participate in a lottery, or to play a gambling device." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 214303. A bet is defined as, "a bargain in which the parties agree that,
dependent upon chance, one stands to win or lose something of value specified in
the agreement." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4302(a).
18. From the language of this statute, it appears that one would have to know
the specific statute exists in order to be in violation of it, or at least have been told
of it, and still allow continued use of the communication devices.
19. See Legality of Gambling over the Internet, 13 Kan. Op. Att'y. Gen. 96-31
(1996).
20. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (stating, "[G] ambling which occurs via
the [I]nternet embodies the very activity that the legislature seeks to prevent.").
21. Id.
22. These states are: Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Montana, New Jersey,
Ohio, Texas and Utah. Their statutes require "knowingly" as an intent require-
ment, as well as "purposefully" or "intentionally."
[Vol. 7: p. I
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss1/1
2000] INTERNET GAMBLING: Is IT WORTH THE RISK? 5
civil standard of "minimum contacts" to hale a defendant into the
state for prosecution. 23
Since the technology explosion on the Internet, lawmakers
have tried, to no avail, to regulate Internet gambling. In March
1997, United States Senator from ArizonaJon Kyl proposed the In-
ternet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997,24 which contained the so-
called "casual bettor" provision. This provision would have sub-
jected Internet gamblers to as much as three months in prison and
fines of $500.25 Two years later, this bill resurfaced without the
"casual bettor" provision. Consequently, all attention is focused on
the operators of Internet gambling sites and not on the actual users
of the sites. Apparently, the motivation behind this type of legisla-
tion is quite political because Internet gambling sites are operated
offshore and therefore not contributing any money to the U.S.
economy.
III. CRIMINAL MENS REA
Knowledge of a material fact is a required element of most of-
fenses. "A person has knowledge of a material fact if he is aware of
the fact, or if he correctly believes that it exists. ' 26 Many times of-
fenses have a willfulness requirement which adds complexity to the
issue. The word "willful" can have several distinct meanings, all of
which may determine whether an offense has been committed.
Possible meanings include "intentional," or "an act with a bad pur-
pose. '27 The outcome of a case may be determined by these terms'
interpretation. For instance, in Cheek v. United States,28 the defen-
dant professed that he did not disobey federal tax laws because he
genuinely believed that they did not apply to him.29 The United
States Supreme Court held that it was an error to instruct the jury
to ignore evidence of the defendant's misinterpretation of the tax
23. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (finding proper exercise of personal jurisdiction because company
purposely availed itself nf business .. hin state).
24. S. 474, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997).
25. See Internet Gambling Commission, supra note 8. Many lawmakers were
not comfortable with the idea of punishing people for placing bets on their com-
puters. See id. Some of Senator Kyl's political allies speculated that concerns about
enforceability killed this provision. See id.
26. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 109 (1995) (defining
common mens rea terms including "knowingly" or "with knowledge").
27. Id. at 111.
28. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
29. See id. at 196 (asserting that defendant did not act with "willfulness" re-
quired for conviction).
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laws.3 0 Since the Cheek decision, there has been a split in decisions
pertaining to the meaning of "specific intent" or "willfulness."
The Cheek decision was expanded from the tax arena to crimi-
nal prosecution in Ratzlafv. United States.3 1 The Court held that in
order to meet the statutory "willfulness" requirement, the govern-
ment must prove the defendant acted with knowledge that structur-
ing was unlawful, not that the defendant purposely intended to
circumvent the bank's reporting obligation. 32
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,3 3 respondents were con-
victed of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (A) (1) and (2). 3 4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had reversed the trial
court, holding that § 2252 was facially unconstitutional under the
First Amendment because it did not require a showing that the de-
fendant knew one of the performers was a minor.3 5 Upon review,
the Supreme Court held that the statute was facially constitutional
because a standard presumption favoring a scienter requirement
applies to each statutory element, criminalizing otherwise innocent
conduct.36 The Court also held that Congress could not have in-
tended for the statute to apply to actors unaware of the sexually
explicit nature of material they transported, shipped, received, dis-
tributed or reproduced. 37
Understanding the above referenced cases is essential in ana-
lyzing the scope of criminal liability in Internet gambling cases be-
cause the defense will rely on the meaning of the term "knowingly"
and how it is applied in this confusing arena. Does a defendant
need to know that his conduct violated a specific law? Given the
logic in the Cheek, Ratzlaf and X-Citement Video cases, a defendant
30. See id. at 203 (discussing that knowledge and belief were characteristics to
be decided by jury).
31. 510 U.S. 135 (1994). The prosecution involved an alleged currency struc-
turing violation under 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1993), which requires a domestic bank
involved in a cash transaction for more than $10,000 to file a report with the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. See Ratzlaf 510 U.S. at 136.
32. See id. at 136-37.
33. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
34. See id. at 65-66. This statute prohibits knowingly transporting, shipping,
receiving, distributing or reproducing a visual depiction if such depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. See id. at 65-66 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1) (A) & (2)(A) (1994)).
35. See id. at 66-67 (discussing defendant's need of factual knowledge for valid
conviction).
36. See id. at 68-69 (holding that "knowingly" modified "the use of a minor").
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's natural grammatical reading of the statute
because it "would produce results that were positively absurd." Id. at 69.
37. See id. at 69. For further discussion of the knowledge requirement, see
infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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could argue either that he/she was not aware that his/her conduct
violated a specific law, or that he/she did not think that the law
applied to his/her conduct. For those who conduct all of their bus-
iness over the Internet, it would be impossible to remain up-to-date
on all the gambling laws in every state in the country.38 Even if it
were possible to remain up-to-date, it is reasonable to believe that
those gambling laws do not apply to them inasmuch as no single
state could possibly have jurisdiction over the entire Internet. In
Cohen v. United States,39 the Ninth Circuit ruled that actual knowl-
edge of the statutory prohibition against wagering was required in
order to obtain a conviction.40 The Tenth Circuit, however, has
recently held that the Cohen analysis is not practical. 41 In United
States v. Blair,42 defendants operated their gambling operation in
the Dominican Republic but accepted bets from people living in
Oklahoma. 43 The court held that the knowledge requirement for
§ 1084 means a general intent to commit the act that forms the
basis of the charges. 44 Hence, as long as the defendants' wagering
was not a result of mistake or accident, the Tenth Circuit found that
general intent satisfied the knowledge element of the statute, and
the court refused to require a specific intent that the person mak-
ing the wager was knowingly committing an unlawful act. The Blair
analysis, however, does not truly address legitimate questions that
may plague a user of the Internet or operator of an Internet gam-
bling company. How is it consistent with due process to convict a
38. According to the author, it is general knowledge that every state except
Nevada has outlawed this type of gambling activity. The author questions whether
an Internet gambling site operator would be deemed to be aware of the gambling
laws of the other forty-nine states.
39. 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967). The Cohen court held:
If knowledge of illegality is an element of the section 1084(a) offense,
those innocent of intentional wrongdoing are afforded a defense. And if
at the same time a rebuttable presumption of such knowledge is recog-
nized, the requirement of knowledge will not substantially impede ac-
complishment of the statute's purpose to discourage professional
interstate gambling.
Id. at 756.
40. See id. at 757 (noting Congress intended that knowledge of prohibition
was required).
41. See United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that
under "specific intent" crimes it is unnecessary to show defendant knowingly and
intentionally violated known legal duty). It is only necessary to do so when Con-
gress clearly intended that it be done. See id. Generally, ignorance of law or mis-
take is not a defense. See id.
42. 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995).
43. See id. at 641.
44. See id. at 642 (distinguishing its interpretation of § 1084 from Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation).
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person, who operates an Internet gaming company and possesses a
lawful license from the site of the company, in the face of technol-
ogy that allows a person to place a bet from anywhere in the world,
if the government only needs to show that an intentional act oc-
curred? Obviously the Internet company acts "intentionally." The
customer presumably acts "intentionally." The bets or act of ac-
cepting bets is not a "mistake" or "accident." To criminalize such
conduct, the law should require something more than general in-
tent, particularly in the face of the complexity of the jurisdictional
issues and the conflicting meaning of the terms "knowingly" and
"intentionally."
There has been at least one criminal prosecution in a state
court relying on traditional gambling statutes. 45 The statute at is-
sue, section 572.010(1) of the Annotated Missouri Statutes, reads
as follows:
A person advances gambling activity if, acting other than
as a player, he engages in conduct that materially aids any
form of gambling activity. Conduct of this nature includes
but is not limited to conduct directed toward the creation
or establishment of the particular game, lottery, contest,
scheme, device or activity involved .... 46
The case was resolved with a plea agreement, and, as a result, some
of the above mentioned issues were never posed for judicial
opinion.
IV. CHOICE OF LAw
As mentioned above, Internet gambling prosecutions implicate
questions concerning jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil cases.
How is it possible for the State of Missouri to exercise jurisdiction
over a Pennsylvania resident for operating an Internet gambling
business out of Grenada?47 Some courts in similar cases focus on
how interactive the Internet Web site is, meaning the more the site
requires participation on the part of a resident, the more a com-
pany can be held accountable in that resident's home state. Courts
interpret interaction as a purposeful entry into the forum state and
45. See State, ex rel Nixon v. Interactive Gaming & Communications Corp.,
No. CV97-7808 (Mo. Ct. App. May 22, 1997) (noting court's application of tradi-
tional gambling statutes).
46. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 572.010(1) (West 1995).
47. See id. (noting complete jurisdictional questions that may arise).
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use a "sliding scale" analysis to categorize the interaction.48 On one
end of the scale is the creation of an informational Web site, which
requires little or no interaction at all. 49 On the other end of the
scale is someone who clearly does business over the Internet. 50 The
middle of the scale consists of interactive Web sites where a user
can exchange information with the host computer.51 In these
cases, jurisdiction is also based on how interactive the site is. 5 2 In
Minnesota, the Court of Appeals found that personal jurisdiction
was proper over an offshore company because of an Internet adver-
tisement concerning an upcoming gambling service and because
the defendant developed a mailing list from the Internet that in-
cluded Minnesota residents.53 Specifically, the court found that the
business had purposely availed itself to do business with residents of
the state because Minnesotans accessed the Web site and called the
toll-free number that was provided therein.54 In this case, the court
once again focused on the amount of participation the Web site
required from residents and used that participation as a basis for
exercising jurisdiction.55
It would seem that the only way to minimize the risk of being
haled into a state for prosecution would be to limit the amount of
interaction the site requires. This approach, however, would
render Internet gambling sites virtually useless. 56 Another option
would be for a company to limit the amount of advertising and pro-
48. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
49. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that Web site which listed ticket information for Missouri night club had
not operated to entice New York residents and, therefore, could not be brought to
New York for trademark infringement action). The court compared the creation
of a Web site to placing a product into the stream of commerce and further noted
that the site was only a posting of information and not an active solicitation for
business. See id. at 300.
50. See Compuserv, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if defendant enters into contracts
with residents of foreign jurisdiction that involve knowing and repeated transmis-
sion of computer files over Internet).
51.. SE- Zippo Mjg., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (noting interaction between host and
user).
52. See id.
53. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718-19 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997).
54. See id. at 718-19 (noting various contacts between business and users).
55. See id.
56. The author notes that limiting the amount of interaction would essentially
nullify the Internet gambling site. If the site does not engage the player in a game
of chance, and thereby encourage interaction with that player, then it ceases to be
a valid Internet gambling site.
9
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motion it does for its site.5 7 Given the enormity of the World Wide
Web, a company could quite possibly go out of business while wait-
ing for its patrons to stumble upon its site, making this option un-
desirable. The only other way to limit the risk of liability would be
to restrict the site's access. A Web site operator could install a filter
either to reject automatically users from certain states, or at the very
least post a disclaimer for residents who are illegally accessing the
site. This option is not foolproof because the disclaimer could be
used incorrectly or a user could avoid the disclaimer entirely.5 8
V. CONCLUSION
The future appears grim for those who operate Internet gam-
bling sites because state gambling statutes are interpreted to find
knowledge of a crime where it may not exist, and states can exercise
jurisdiction over most non-resident defendants. The frightening as-
pect of this analysis is that the trend might not stop with Internet
gambling. If any state in the country may police the Internet by
exercising jurisdiction over defendants, then the World Wide Web
is about to get much smaller.
57. The author notes that this would include eliminating hyper-links in re-
lated Web sites, as well as removing itself from Internet providers' databases. Many
times, players are able to find Internet gambling sites simply by using their In-
ternet provider's search engine and plugging in the words "Internet Gambling."
58. See State, ex rel. Nixon v. Interactive Gaming & Communications Corp.,
No. CV97-7808 (Mo. Ct. App. May 22, 1997) (noting that site's operator tried to
restrict access to Missouri residents; they were still able to log onto site, either by
themselves or through site's employees).
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